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The Gender Pay Gap in UK Medicine*
In this study we quantify the size and drivers of the contemporary gender pay gap among 
medical doctors employed in the UK public sector. In using nationally representative data 
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, we make comparisons to doctors employed 
in the private sector, as well as to other public sector medical professionals. We find that 
the substantial 20 per cent hourly gender pay gap among public sector doctors is far larger 
than in either of these comparator occupations. Decomposing the mean gender pay gap 
for public sector doctors, we find that it is largely unexplained by personal and work-
related characteristics, consistent with evidence of potential substantial gender inequality 
in rewards. It is at the top end of the wage distribution where this is most pronounced 
indicating the presence of a ‘glass ceiling’ in UK medicine.
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In May 2018 Jeremy Hunt, as secretary of state for Health, announced that he was determined 
to eliminate the gender pay gap (hereinafter, GPG) among doctors in the UK National Health 
Service (hereinafter, NHS). This was in light of evidence of a mean annual GPG of £10,000 
or 15 per cent, identified using administrative (payroll) data, which was viewed as 
inconsistent with the principle of equality enshrined in the NHS and prompted a 
comprehensive review.
1
 Using nationally representative data from the Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (hereinafter, ASHE), we provide new evidence on the GPG and gender 
pay equality among public sector medical doctors in Britain.
2
 To our knowledge, we are the 
first to use national survey data to examine the GPG among this highly skilled occupation 
and, in using these data we are able to make comparisons of the size and drivers of the GPG 
with comparator occupations. We do this both at the mean and across the wage distribution. 
In doing so, we contribute important evidence from the UK public sector healthcare context 
to the international literature on the GPG among physicians, which is dominated by studies 
from the US private sector. The findings are also complementary to the evidence provided by 
the recent GPG review (see Department of Health and Social Care, 2020) and directly 
relevant to contemporary UK government policy. 
There has been interest in the GPG among physicians in the US for several decades 
with evidence suggesting a sizeable and persistent GPG among often self-employed 
physicians within this largely private healthcare system that is only partly explained by 
gender differences in observable characteristics, consistent with evidence of wage inequality 
(Ohsfeldt and Culler, 1986; Bashaw and Heywood, 2001; Esteves-Sorenson and Snyder, 
2012). By exploring the GPG among physicians in the Austrian province of Tyrol where, in 





 We do not have access to comparable information for Northern Ireland.  
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the public health insurance system self-employed physicians do not control the price of 
services, Theurl and Winner (2010) provide important evidence from a different institutional 
context. Nevertheless, they similarly find a pronounced unexplained GPG of comparable 
magnitude to that reported in the US. More closely related to our study given the focus on 
employees, Magnusson (2016) explores the GPG for a sample of public and private sector 
physicians in Sweden and find the vast majority of the GPG is unexplained even after 
accounting for speciality and parenthood. While sectoral differences in the GPG are not 
explored in this context, Gaiaschi (2019) provides evidence from Italy, where the 
unexplained hourly GPG among hospital doctors is found to be larger in the private than the 
public sector. To our knowledge, however, the limited analysis within the UK has been 
restricted to General Practitioners (hereinafter, GPs) in the NHS, who are typically self-
employed, and where, in England, Gravelle et al. (2011) find a sizeable unexplained gender 
gap in income, but limited evidence of gender discrimination in profit sharing arrangements 
within practices.  
Our analysis therefore provides a distinct contribution to the international literature in 
focusing exclusively on doctors employed in the public sector in Britain. In doing so, it 
provides new evidence of gender inequality within this profession that aligns to the focus on 
employer discrimination within labour economics. It serves as a particularly useful contrast 
given the distinct institutional features, including the presence of national and transparent 
salary scales which are typical in the UK public sector, and coverage of pay 
recommendations by the independent Review Body on Doctors’ and Dentists’ Remuneration 
(hereinafter, DDRB) whose remit includes due regard for legal obligations, including those 
under the 2010 Equality Act and Public Sector Equality Duty (hereinafter, PSED).
3
 In this 
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The focus on doctors is also consistent with increasing recognition of the importance 
of GPGs within rather than between occupations to the national GPG and insights provided 
by occupation specific analysis, especially for highly skilled professionals (see, for example, 
Azmat and Ferrer, 2017 for lawyers, and Goldin and Katz, 2016 for pharmacists). In the UK, 
existing studies have provided evidence relating to law (McNabb and Wass, 2006) and higher 
education (McNabb and Wass, 1997), including academic economists (Mumford and Sechel, 
2020), where, due to the more homogeneous nature of workers and their jobs, it is argued that 
the bias arising from the unobserved characteristics is more limited. As such, consideration of 
a prestigious, highly skilled and highly paid occupation within the public sector, which is 
fairly unique in being characterised by broadly equal representation by gender, provides 
further insights into the UK public sector GPG (see, for example, Jones et al., 2018; Jones 




To our knowledge, the only other study to consider the GPG in this context is the 
recent review of the GPG in medicine (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020) which 
utilise administrative data on hospital doctors in England.
6  
Unlike the existing literature they 
find the majority (92 per cent) of the 20 per cent GPG in basic pay is explained by observable 
characteristics including seniority, work experience and hours of work.
7
 Our evidence is 
                                                          
4
 McNabb and Wass (1997) note a similar dearth of analysis on UK universities relative to that in the US, which 
they argue is a consequence of the assumption of limited discrimination in formalised salary structures. 
However, they find evidence of a significant unexplained GPG in UK academia.  
5
 See, Jones et al. (2018) for a discussion in relation to the UK GPG.  
6
 The review also considers self-employed GPs and clinical academics separately. Appleby and Schlepper 
(2019) consider the GPG in the NHS more generally and find evidence of a far larger GPG among employees 
outside the Agenda for Change job evaluation system, which includes doctors. Consistent with this, Jones and 
Kaya (2019) find a larger raw and unexplained GPG among workers covered by the DDRB than the NHS Pay 
Review Body. 
7
 They find a smaller, although still dominant role for characteristics (70 per cent) when using total pay. 
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complementary, but in utilising nationally representative data we extend the focus across 
occupations to explore the relative situation of public sector doctors and, in doing so, set the 
findings into the broader UK context. Following the literature on public-private sector GPG 
comparisons, we first make a within occupation comparison between sectors, that is, we 
compare doctors employed in the public and private sector.
8
 Second, we make a comparison 
within the public sector but across closely related occupations, by considering doctors 
relative to the other public sector ‘Health Professionals’. Finally, we provide a well-
established benchmark, comparing doctors to all other employees in the public sector.
9
 
Unlike the majority of the evidence focusing on the mean GPG among doctors (for 
exceptions see Shih and Konrad, 2007 and Magnusson, 2016), we also perform our analysis 
across the wage distribution. The former is well-established to be important in understanding 
the GPG (see, for example, Albrecht et al., 2003) and in comparisons of the GPG across 
sectors (see Arulampalam et al., 2007; Jones and Kaya, 2019). 
We find a substantial hourly GPG among public sector doctors of 20 log per cent, 
which is about three times as large as among either private sector doctors or other public 
sector health professionals. Indeed, despite the more homogeneous workforce, the within 
occupation GPG among public sector doctors is larger than comparable estimates for the 
entire economy. Moreover, the vast majority (over 90 per cent) of the mean GPG is 
unexplained by traditional personal and work-related characteristics and, as such, the 
unexplained GPG also far exceeds that in the comparator occupations. This is particularly 
true at the upper end of the wage distribution where we find that the GPG among public 
sector doctors exhibits a pronounced ‘glass ceiling’.   
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 Public-private sector GPG comparisons are typically considered in aggregate, despite pronounced differences 
in occupational and industrial structure (see, Arulampalam et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2018). 
9
 For simplicity we refer to these groups as comparator occupations throughout the paper, noting however, that 
the public sector comparator in particular contains a diverse set of occupations. 
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 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of our data and measures analysed. A brief outline of the decomposition methods applied to 
explore the GPG at the mean and across the wage distribution is provided in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data  
The analysis is based on data from ASHE, the main source of earnings data in the UK (ONS, 
2020), which contain detailed and reliable information on pay, occupation and sector, and for 
a large enough sample (1 per cent sample of employee jobs) to explore the GPG among 
doctors. We provide contemporary evidence, based on the latest year of these data, April 
2018.
10
 Unlike much of the literature on the GPG in medicine, where pay is self-reported via 
occupation specific surveys (and often in bands), the ASHE is based on employer payroll 
records.
11 
It also has several advantages in this context as these data are nationally 
representative and provide information using established measures that are comparable across 
occupations, and across Britain.
12
 Moreover, the sample is sufficiently large to explore 
specific occupational groups. The trade-off, however, is that ASHE contains a fairly limited 




The sample is restricted to working-age individuals who are paid an adult rate, and 
whose earnings are not affected by absence.
14
 Calibration weights are applied so the estimates 
are representative of the respective population, but we also report the unweighted number of 
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 2018 is the latest year of confirmed data available at the time of writing. The findings are, however, robust to 
alternatively using data from 2017 or provisional data from 2019. The analysis is therefore prior to the 
implementation of the 2020 junior doctor contract in England. 
11
 For a criticism of self-reported information for physicians see Theurl and Winner (2010) who argue that 
gender differences in response rates and self-reported income bias estimation of the GPG. 
12
 This is unlike occupation specific payroll data (e.g. from NHS digital in England). 
13
 In order to address the former we explored the possibility of using the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
(hereinafter, QLFS) but the sample size is far smaller than ASHE and precludes the analysis of private sector 
doctors.  
14
 About 6 per cent of public sector doctors hold more than one job. We explore the robustness of our analysis to 
second job holding in Section 4.  
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observations (denoted N). After excluding individuals with missing values for any of the 
variables used in the analysis we are left with 160,115 employees.  
Public sector doctors  
As is typical in the literature on the GPG, but not the existing international evidence relating 
to physicians (see, for example, Theurl and Winner, 2010), our focus is employees where 
information is provided via employer PAYE tax records.
15
 We define medical doctors as 
employees whose occupation is ‘Medical Practitioners’ (i.e. Standard Occupational 
Classification (hereinafter, SOC) (2010) code 2211). We further separate doctors employed 
in the public sector based on the legal status of the enterprise from the Inter-Departmental 
Business Register.
16
 Doctors in the public sector will include hospital doctors across all 
grades and medical specialities, and some salaried GPs. We acknowledge private sector 
doctors are a relatively small group in the UK, however, given the similarity in training and 
job responsibilities, they form an interesting within occupation comparator with a distinct 
employer, operating in a different institutional and legal framework.
17 
We construct two 
further between occupation comparators operating within the public sector institutional 
framework. The first includes employees in ‘similar’ highly skilled medical occupations, as 
defined as all other occupations within the broader minor SOC 221 group (i.e. Health 
Professionals) which includes doctors.
18
 The second provides a broader national benchmark 
and includes all other public sector employees. As noted above, we refer to these as 
                                                          
15
 Self-employed workers are excluded from the ASHE. Data from the 2018 QLFS suggests that only 15 per 
cent of medical doctors in Britain are self-employed and this does not differ by gender.   
16
 The public sector is defined as public corporations and nationalised industries, central government or local 
authorities. While the vast majority of doctors work in the NHS, this definition also includes doctors working 
elsewhere in the public sector e.g. in the Armed Forces. Our definition of private sector includes those working 
in the voluntary sector but our results are not sensitive to this (available upon request).  
17
 Private sector doctors would not, for example, be covered by the DDRB or PSED. 
18
 Health professionals included in this definition include the following 4-digit SOC occupations: 2212 
(Psychologists), 2213 (Pharmacists), 2214 (Ophthalmic opticians), 2215 (Dental practitioners), 2216 
(Veterinarians), 2217 (Medical radiographers), 2218 (Podiatrists) and 2219 (Health professionals n.e.c.). Full 
details and job duties are provided within the SOC classification but all these occupations require degree level 
qualifications recognised by the appropriate professional body. The contribution of each occupation to public 
sector health professionals is provided in Appendix Table A1.  
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comparator occupations but recognise the public sector in particular contains a diverse set of 
occupations.  
The final sample includes 1,099 public sector doctors, who account for 0.8 per cent of all 
employees and 3.6 per cent of public sector employees (see Table 1). Our sample for private 
sector doctors and the rest of public sector health professionals is 243 and 604 respectively. 
Consistent with previous evidence, there is a relatively equal gender representation among 
doctors in Britain with females accounting for 44 and 54 per cent in the public and private 
sector respectively. Although women represent about half of all employees, they represent 
more than two thirds of employees in the rest of the public sector and 70 per cent of the rest 
of public sector health professionals.   
[Table 1 here] 
Hourly pay 
In line with the established GPG literature, and our focus on employees, our main dependent 
variable is (log) gross hourly pay, which adjusts pay during the reference period for hours of 
work.
19
 This measure is based on the ONS recommended definition, excluding overtime, but 
including performance-related pay (hereinafter, PRP) paid within the reference period.
20,21,22 
                                                          
19
 This is appropriate given public sector doctors are paid an annual salary on the basis of standard weekly 
working hours and salaries are calculated pro rata for those working part-time. Nevertheless, given the concerns 
raised by Bashaw and Heywood (2001), albeit in the US context, we also explore the sensitivity of the estimates 
with respect to an annual measure of pay (see Section 4). Additional payments are available for public sector 
doctors working overtime and antisocial hours and there is also an element of performance-related pay. These 
are all considered here. Additional payments for shortage specialities cannot, however, be explored.  
20
 Gross hourly pay is calculated as gross weekly earnings (basic weekly earnings + incentive pay + additional 
premium payments for shift work and night or weekend work not treated as overtime + pay received for other 
reasons) excluding overtime for the reference period divided by basic weekly paid hours. Premium payments 
and paid overtime are more important for public sector doctors than the comparator occupations. The gender 
gaps in these additional payments are, however, less pronounced than for the comparator occupations (further 
details available upon request). 
21
 We remove wage outliers defined as above ten times the 99
th
 percentile and below half the 1
st
 percentile (120 
observations).  
22
 Gender equality in PRP is a policy concern (see DDRB, 2020) and, consistent with this, the GPG in medicine 
review find the gap in total pay is greater than that in basic pay (Department for Health and Social Care, 2020) 
and that Clinical Excellence Awards make an important contribution to the unexplained GPG among 
consultants. We explore the role of PRP when considering annual pay (see Section 4).  
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Unlike data from occupation specific surveys or administrative records our well-established 
measure of pay facilitates comparisons to national measures and across occupations. The 
mean log hourly pay is reported by gender in Table 2 and confirms the relatively high hourly 
pay among doctors, which is about 0.11 log points (or 11 log per cent) higher in the public 
sector than the private sector on average, and 76 log per cent higher among public sector 
doctors than the rest of the public sector. The figures also confirm a substantial hourly GPG 
among public sector doctors of 20 log per cent, which is actually larger than the economy 
wide GPG (17 log per cent) despite the within occupation and sector focus. Our estimate of 
the hourly GPG is of comparable magnitude to the full-time equivalent GPG among hospital 
doctors in England at between 20 and 23 per cent, depending on the specific pay measure 
used (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020). Comparisons across occupations indicate 
the GPG among public sector doctors is far wider than among private sector doctors (6 log 
per cent) and the rest of public sector health professionals (7 log per cent). It is actually more 
comparable to the rest of the public sector (17 log per cent), despite the diversity in 
occupational composition. The wider GPG among doctors in the public relative to private 
sector is particularly surprising given previous evidence of a lower GPG in the public relative 
to private sector as a whole (Jones et al., 2018).
23
  
[Table 2 here] 
Explanatory variables 
ASHE contains detailed information about the nature of the job and employer, and our 
control variables for work-related characteristics include firm size (log of number of 
employees), tenure (measured by the number of years employed in the present organisation) 
(and tenure-squared), an indicator for the coverage of collective agreements, a permanent 
                                                          
23
 Worth noting is that the relatively wide pay distribution among public sector doctors (as measured by the 
standard deviation), which might be thought to contribute to the wide within-occupation GPG, is also evident in 
the private sector. 
10 
 
contract indicator and a full-time employment dummy which are all well-established 
determinants of earnings (see, for example, Blau and Kahn, 2017).
24 
For the rest of the public 
sector, we additionally control for occupation using the SOC unit group and, for other health 
professionals, we control for more detailed SOC codes.
25
 We also control for industry for the 
rest of the public sector using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007 sections.
26
 In 
terms of personal characteristics, information in ASHE is restricted to age (and age-squared), 
which is used as a proxy for work experience, and work region.
27,28,29
 
A full set of summary statistics for the explanatory variables by gender and occupation 
are included in Appendix Table A1. They confirm a number of distinct features of doctors, 
particularly lower average job tenure and, in the public sector, a lower proportion with 
permanent contracts and higher rates of full-time employment. Private sector doctors are 
more likely to work in London, far less likely to work full-time, work in smaller 
organisations and are less likely to be covered by collective agreements than those in the 
public sector. While some established patterns by gender are evident across all occupations, 
for example, females have shorter average job tenure than men, there are also some distinct 
occupational patterns. For instance, while females are less likely to work full-time in all 
                                                          
24
 ASHE defines full-time employees as those who work more than 30 hours per week (or 25 for those in 
teaching professions). 
25
 We group SOC 2010 code 2219 Health Professionals n.e.c together with 2214 Ophthalmic opticians and 2216 
Veterinarians due to small sample size in these categories.  
26
 Despite the range of occupations, most public sector workers are clustered into a relatively small number of 
industries. We distinguish between the following four groups: O Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security; P Education; Q Human health and social work activities and Other (which contains anything 
outside these three groups). 
27
 Controls for work region capture variation in wages arising from health being devolved in Wales and 
Scotland. Due to the small samples, however, Wales is aggregated with the West of England, but the results are 
robust to this choice (available upon request). 
28
 Our attention on individual and organisation characteristics (as defined by Shih and Konrad, 2007) is aligned 
to the focus on employees (where market forces are less relevant).  
29
 Having a relatively restricted set of personal characteristics is not unusual when using payroll data but a 
potentially important omission is a control for dependent children. Among young US physicians, however, 
Sasser (2005) highlights the role of marriage and children as an important driver of the gender income gap via 
an impact on hours rather than hourly pay. Nevertheless, this may still have implications for hourly pay over the 
life-cycle due to lower human capital accumulation.  
11 
 
occupations, the gender gap is much narrower for public sector doctors than the comparator 
occupations.  
 Despite the strengths of these data, particularly the accuracy of data on earnings, and 
ability to compare across occupations using a specification comparable to the literature on the 
national GPG, since the survey is not collected specifically for the profession we are not able 
to control for within occupation characteristics such as medical specialism or seniority. 
Previous international studies have generally found modest effects of specialisation (see 
Theurl and Winner, 2011; Magnusson, 2016) and this was also found to be relatively 
unimportant in explaining the GPG among hospital doctors in England (Department of Health 
and Social Care, 2020). In contrast, and as might be expected, seniority or vertical 
segregation has been found to be important internationally given the underrepresentation of 
females in senior roles (Gaiaschi, 2019) and, in the recent GPG review seniority, as measured 
by grade (a direct determinant of pay), was found to be the most important component of the 
explained GPG (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020). When seniority is directly 
related to pay, we argue their joint determination precludes including seniority as an 
explanation for the GPG (see Albrecht et al., 2003 for a discussion in relation to occupation). 
More, generally, in a similar manner to the debate about the inclusion of occupation when 
decomposing the national GPG (see Blau and Kahn, 2017), if vertical segregation among 
doctors is partly due to discrimination, the unexplained GPG will understate discrimination 
when controls for seniority are included.
30
 For example, in the extreme, after accounting for 
differences in seniority there might be no unexplained within occupation GPG but there 
might be substantial and neglected gender inequality in promotion. In contrast, however, if 
seniority is determined by individual preferences (see, for example, Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 
                                                          
30
 See McNabb and Wass (1997) for similar concerns in relation to higher education.  
12 
 
2007), including the ability to combine work with family commitments, its exclusion, as in 
our analysis, will mean the unexplained GPG likely overstates discrimination.  
3. Econometric method 
To explore the mean GPG, we apply established decomposition methods (Oaxaca, 1973; 
Blinder, 1973), widely used in the analysis of the national GPG, and the international GPG 
among physicians, to public sector doctors in Britain. Consistent with the literature, our focus 
is on isolating the contribution of gender differences in observable characteristics from 
unobserved influences on the GPG, where the latter is typically interpreted as an upper bound 
measure of discrimination since it will include gender differences in productivity or 
preferences, albeit the influence of these are likely to be reduced in a within occupation 
context.  
To explore the drivers of the mean GPG within each of the comparator occupations (j) 
we estimate the following earnings equations: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑔,𝑗 = 𝒙𝒈,𝒋𝜷𝒈,𝒋 + 𝜀𝑔,𝑗  (1) 
where the natural logarithm of gross hourly earnings of individual of gender 𝑔 in occupation j 
(𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑔,𝑗) is regressed on a set of explanatory variables (𝒙𝒈,𝒋) and 𝜀𝑔,𝑗 is a random error term. 
The vector of returns to characteristics 𝜷𝒈,𝒋 is estimated separately by gender 𝑔 (male (m) and 
female (f)) and for each comparator j. With the exception of occupation and industry (see 
above discussion), the explanatory variables in 𝒙𝒈,𝒋 are common across specifications and 
include the personal and work-related characteristics described above.  
This approach, which allows the return to characteristics to vary by gender, facilitates 
an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the raw GPG into its explained and unexplained 
components within each occupation as follows: 
13 
 
 𝑙𝑛 𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑚,𝑗 − 𝑙𝑛 𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?,𝑗 = (?̅?𝒎,𝒋 − ?̅?𝒇,𝒋)?̂?𝒎,𝒋 + ?̅?𝒇,𝒋(?̂?𝒎,𝒋 − ?̂?𝒇,𝒋) (2) 
where the bar above a variable denotes the mean value and ?̂?𝒈,𝒋 is the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimate of 𝜷𝒈,𝒋. In equation (2), the first component is the ‘explained GPG’ and 
measures that part of the GPG due to gender differences in the observable characteristics 
while the second component, referred as the ‘unexplained GPG’, reflects gender differences 
in the return to those attributes. The latter is typically interpreted as a measure of wage 
discrimination, albeit the limitations are well-established in the presence of unobservable 
characteristics (see, for example, Neumark, 2018).
31
 
To explore the GPG across distribution, we specify the 𝜃th (0 < 𝜃 < 1) conditional 
quantile of the log of hourly pay distribution linear in the set of covariates 𝒙𝒈,𝒋, that is, 
𝑞𝜃(𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑔,𝑗| 𝒙𝒈,𝒋) = 𝒙𝒈,𝒋𝜷𝒈,𝒋(𝜽) implying:  
 𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑔,𝑗 = 𝒙𝒈,𝒋𝜷𝒈,𝒋(𝜽) +  𝜃𝑔,𝑗  (3) 
where 𝜃𝑔,𝑗 satisfies 𝑞𝜃(𝜃𝑔,𝑗| 𝒙𝒈,𝒋) = 0. Equation (3) can be estimated using the 
optimisation techniques described in Koenker and Bassett (1978) and the estimated vector of 
quantile regression coefficients, ?̂?𝒈,𝒋(𝜽), can be used to decompose the difference between 
males and females at different points of the log hourly pay distributions into an explained and 
unexplained component using a suitably adapted version of the decomposition method in 
equation (2) by Machado and Mata (2005). The GPG in occupation j at 𝜃th quantile can 
therefore be decomposed as: 
 𝒙𝒎,𝒋?̂?𝒎,𝒋(𝜽) − 𝒙𝒇,𝒋?̂?𝒇,𝒋(𝜽) = (𝒙𝒎,𝒋 − 𝒙𝒇,𝒋)?̂?𝒎,𝒋(𝜽) + 𝒙𝒇,𝒋(?̂?𝒎,𝒋(𝜽) − ?̂?𝒇,𝒋(𝜽))   (4) 
                                                          
31
 Following Blau and Kahn (2017), equation (2) uses as the counterfactual the earnings of an average woman at 
the male returns (𝒙𝒇,𝒋?̂?𝒎,𝒋), which assumes the latter represent competitive prices. We nevertheless explore the 
sensitivity of the findings to weighting the difference in characteristics by the female returns and returns 
estimated using a pooled model with a gender dummy variable following Fortin (2008) (see Section 4).  
14 
 
where the first component is the contribution of differences in observable characteristics and 
the second component is the contribution of differences in the coefficients to the difference 
between the 𝜃th quantile of the male and female pay distributions.32 In this way we can 
compare the unexplained GPG across the wage distribution and identify the presence of 
‘sticky floors’ or ‘glass ceilings’, where the unexplained GPG is higher at the bottom or top 




Mean Hourly GPG 
Table 3 presents the mean hourly GPG decomposition results for the four occupations.
33
 In 
the upper panel the raw GPG is separated into its explained and unexplained components. For 
public sector doctors, only a small (9.3 per cent) and statistically insignificant part of the 19.9 
log per cent raw hourly GPG is explained by personal and work-related characteristics. The 
remaining 18.0 log per cent GPG is therefore unexplained and forms our upper bound 
estimate of gender wage inequality among doctors in the public sector in Britain. Albeit in 
different contexts and therefore using different specifications, our estimate of the unexplained 
hourly GPG is of comparable magnitude to international estimates for physicians (see, for 
example, Bashaw and Heywood, 2001 for the US (20 per cent), Theurl and Winner, 2010 for 
Austria (15 per cent) and Gaiaschi, 2019 for Italy (17 per cent)) but is smaller than for annual 
income among self-employed GPs in Britain (Gravelle et al., 2011 (30 per cent)).  
The results for public sector doctors are, however, in stark contrast to doctors in the 
private sector, where we find a small (3 log per cent) and statistically insignificant 
unexplained GPG. While the majority of the GPG among the rest of public sector medical 
                                                          
32
 The decomposition of differences in wage distributions is applied using the approach proposed by Melly 
(2006), which estimates the raw GPG by using the conditional quantile regression model and then by integrating 
over the covariates. Melly (2006) shows that this procedure is numerically identical to the Machado-Mata 
decomposition method when the number of simulations used in Machado-Mata procedure goes to infinity. 
33
 A full set of coefficient estimates for the wage equations by gender and occupation is available upon request.  
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professionals is also unexplained, the absolute unexplained GPG at 6 log per cent is 
considerably smaller than among public sector doctors and not statistically significant. 
Therefore, we find no evidence of gender pay inequality in either of these two comparator 
occupations. Within the rest of the public sector, where gender differences in occupational 
and industrial distribution contribute to the explained gap, the unexplained gap of 12 log per 
cent is also below that among public sector doctors.
34
 In the context of nationally agreed 
salary scales and limited scope for individual bargaining, our findings therefore point to a 
surprisingly large within occupation and sector unexplained GPG.        
[Table 3 here] 
 While the explained gap among public sector doctors is relatively small, we further 
separate its potentially offsetting drivers in the lower panel of Table 3. We find an important 
role for age in explaining the GPG, with a widening influence as a consequence of a 
relatively steep age-earnings profile among public sector doctors, combined with males being 
older than females on average. This is consistent with recent evidence from the GPG in 
medicine review (Department of Health and Social Care, 2020) and underpins their concerns 
relating to long pay scales that reward time served among doctors. Consistent with this, 
public sector doctors are the only occupation we consider where age significantly widens the 
GPG.
35
 In contrast, gender differences in full-time employment have a negative (narrowing) 
effect on the GPG and act to largely offset the influence of age. This is surprising, although 
the importance of hours as a determinant of the GPG in literature on medicine at least in part 
                                                          
34
 Controlling for more detailed occupational and industrial categories is likely to increase the explained 
component and therefore our estimate of the unexplained public sector GPG represents an upper bound. 
Consistent with this, controlling for SOC unit group narrows the unexplained public sector GPG to 9.8 log per 
cent (results available upon request). 
35
 In contrast to evidence from the US (see Lo Sasso et al., 2011) analysis by age group shows no significant 
GPG among public sector doctors aged under 30, consistent with the GPG developing over the life course rather 
than being evident on entry to the profession. These results are available upon request.  
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reflects the extensive use of annual pay.
36
 Consistent with broader evidence, male doctors are 
more likely to work full-time than women. However, in contrast to the well-established 
literature on the part-time pay penalty, we find a penalty for full-time work among doctors.
37
 
Bashaw and Heywood (2001) argue the negative relationship between hourly pay and hours 
is a function of diminishing marginal productivity in the US, where (self-employed) 
physicians might be able to select more profitable work. However, this does not appear to be 
a plausible explanation for our findings given the nature of public sector pay scales. A more 
likely explanation seems to be an income effect whereby high earners have an incentive to 
reduce hours, particularly given limits on earnings imposed by pension taxation rules 
affecting highly paid doctors. Nevertheless, and in contrast to expectations, in the absence of 
the higher rate of part-time employment among female relative to male doctors the GPG 
among public sector doctors would be even larger.
38
  
Sensitivity Analysis  
We explore the robustness of these findings to changes to the decomposition methodology, 
measurement of hourly pay, model specification and year of data in Appendix Table A2. 
More specifically, we explore the sensitivity of our benchmark results to the decomposition 
method using female coefficient estimates as the baseline (Panel A) and then using 
coefficients from a pooled model following Fortin (2008) (Panel B). The change in reference 
coefficients make little difference to the estimates for public sector doctors, the rest of the 
public sector health professionals or the rest of the public sector. The estimates are more 
sensitive for private sector doctors, likely reflecting the small sample size, but the main 
                                                          
36
 Gaiaschi (2019), for example, find that while hours narrow the annual GPG among physicians in Italy they act 
to widen the hourly GPG.  
37
 This is evident for both males and females, albeit it is larger for males in the public sector. Manning and 
Petrongolo (2008) find the part-time pay penalty in Britain to largely be a function of occupational segregation 
and this provides a likely explanation for the difference in findings. Indeed, they find a premium within some 
occupations.  
38
 A similar effect is evident among the public sector as whole where, as expected, gender differences in 
occupation and industry both explain part of the GPG. 
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patterns remain consistent, that is, the unexplained gap is significant for public sector doctors 
and larger than for the other three occupations. 
In relation to the measurement of hourly pay we explore the robustness of our results 
to the inclusion of overtime (Panel C) and exclusion of additional premium payments (Panel 
D). Neither change affects the results, suggesting the GPG among public sector doctors is not 
a function of overtime or additional earnings, albeit the GPG is slightly wider than when 
using our preferred measure of hourly pay. 
Given the importance of full-time employment as a driver of the GPG among public 
sector doctors we also explore the GPG among full-time employees (Panel E) and full-time, 
full-year employees (where the latter is defined as 40 weeks following Goldin and Katz 
(2016)) (Panel F), where males and females are likely to have similar levels of labour market 
commitment (Blau and Kahn, 2017). While the raw GPG for public sector doctors is similar 
for all and full-time workers, the explained component of the GPG increases (consistent with 
the negative role of full-time work identified above). As a result, the unexplained GPG 
narrows relative to among all public sector doctors. In contrast, the estimates for full-time, 
full-year workers look more similar to all doctors. Regardless of the choice, the unexplained 
GPG among public sector doctors remains larger than among the rest of the public sector 
health professionals and the rest of the public sector. A far smaller proportion of private 
sector doctors work full-time, which restricts the sample size further, meaning these results 
should be interpreted with caution. While the unexplained GPG widens among full-time 
private sector doctors the patterns for full-time, full-year doctors are more similar to that for 
all private sector doctors, and in both cases the unexplained GPG remains insignificantly 
different from zero. 
We also adapt the specification of our wage equation to explore the influence of 
weighting (Panel G) and controlling for, and alternatively excluding, second job holders 
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(Panels H and I respectively). None of these changes affect our main results. We also explore 
the robustness of the findings to the year of analysis by using data from 2017 (Panel J) and 
provisional data from 2019 (Panel K). Again, while the precise estimates for private sector 
doctors vary, the pattern of results is robust. 
Mean Annual GPG 
Given the concerns of Bashaw and Heywood (2001) and Gravelle et al. (2011) we also 
decompose the log of annual rather than hourly pay and these results are presented in Table 4, 
where our measure includes and excludes PRP in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. In both 
specifications we include additional controls for hours per week and weeks worked per year. 
As might be expected given the higher prevalence of part-time work among females, the 
annual GPG is consistently larger than the hourly GPG. However, the extent of this 
difference varies considerably across occupations. The annual GPG for public sector doctors 
is nearly double that of the hourly GPG but for private sector doctors the increase is nearly 
six times. For all occupations a greater proportion of the annual GPG is explained, reflecting 
the importance of gender differences in hours and weeks worked. Indeed, for most 
occupations the absolute unexplained GPG is similar to that based on hourly pay.
39
 The 
exception is private sector doctors, where the unexplained GPG in annual pay is much larger 
than for hourly pay. Nevertheless, this remains insignificantly different from zero and smaller 
than among public sector doctors, consistent with our benchmark results. The findings are 
also similar when PRP, which is more accurately measured on an annual basis, is excluded 
from pay suggesting that, despite policy concerns, PRP is not a key driver of the GPG among 
public sector doctors. 
[Table 4 here] 
                                                          
39
 For public sector doctors this is largely due to gender differences in weeks worked per year contributing to the 
explained GPG. Results from the detailed decompositions for annual pay are available upon request. 
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GPG across the distribution 
Figure 1 presents a corresponding hourly GPG decomposition across the entire pay 
distribution for each of the four occupations.
40
 For public sector doctors, the raw GPG, which 
is given by the solid line, is evident throughout the distribution and increases from about 10 
log per cent at the 10
th
 percentile to 22 log per cent at the median. Beyond this there is a 
levelling off until the 80
th
 percentile after which the GPG continues to rise until it reaches 
about 30 log per cent at the top end of the distribution. Characteristics play a more important 
role in the middle of the distribution but the GPG is nevertheless largely unexplained across 
the distribution. Indeed, it is virtually entirely unexplained at the bottom end of the 
distribution and is more than 100 per cent explained above the 80
th
 percentile. The 31 log per 
cent unexplained GPG at the 90
th
 percentile substantially exceeds that at other parts of the 
distribution consistent with the presence of a ‘glass ceiling’, or greater wage inequality 
among high earners.
41
 As such, our findings are consistent with Magnusson (2016) who finds 
a ‘glass ceiling’ among physicians in Sweden but contrast with Shih and Konrad (2007) who, 
as part of a broader analysis across the distribution, provide evidence of ‘sticky floors’ among 
physicians in the US in the 1990’s, albeit both studies identify the GPG from a pooled model 
rather than using the decomposition methods applied here.
42
 In the context of clearly defined 
salary scales such findings are likely reflect gender differences in the probability of 
promotion, consistent with previous evidence of unexplained gender differences in promotion 
to consultant in Scotland (Mavromaras and Scott, 2006). 
[Figure 1 here] 
                                                          
40
 The corresponding results relating to selected points of the distribution are reported in Appendix Table A3. 
41
 This exceeds the criteria set out by Arulampalam et al. (2007) who define a ‘glass ceiling’ as an unexplained 
GPG 2 percentage points larger at the 90th percentile relative to at other points (e.g. the 50th or 75th percentiles) 
of the wage distribution. 
42
 Evidence of a ‘glass ceiling’ is also consistent with previous evidence relating to high skilled, white collar 
workers in Britain (Chzhen and Mumford, 2011) and within the public sector (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Jones 
and Kaya, 2019). 
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In terms of the comparator occupations, analysis at the median confirms our benchmark 
findings. The GPG for private sector doctors is more pronounced at the upper and lower tails 
of the distribution but, as with the mean, it is not statistically significantly different from zero 
at most points of the distribution. There is also evidence of a ‘glass ceiling’ among public 
sector health professionals, and the public sector but the unexplained GPG in both these 
comparator occupations remains well below public sector doctors.
43
 In short, the unexplained 
hourly GPG for public doctors is greater than in the comparator occupations not only at the 
mean but across the earnings distribution.  
In a similar manner to the mean hourly GPG, we explore the sensitivity of our findings 
to performing the decomposition using the female coefficients as the baseline, different 
measures of pay (including annual pay), a subsample of full-time workers, different model 
specifications including weighting and second job holding, and to using different years of 
ASHE. We observe evidence of an unexplained GPG throughout the wage distribution for 





Prompted by a ministerial commitment to end the GPG among doctors in the NHS, this paper 
uses nationally representative data to investigate the contemporary GPG among doctors 
employed in the public sector in Britain. In doing so, we are able to put our findings into 
context by making comparisons with other related occupations. Despite the selection of a 
relatively narrow and high skilled occupation, with broadly equal representation by gender 
and, the focus on public sector employment we find evidence of a sizeable hourly GPG 
                                                          
43
 This is true at most points of the distribution for the rest of the public sector. 
44
 These results are not reported for brevity, but all estimates are available upon request. 
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among medical doctors, at 20 log per cent, which exceeds corresponding national GPG, 
estimated for all employees.  
While the substantial GPG among public sector doctors in Britain is surprising given 
the institutional and policy context, it is consistent with international studies based on 
predominately private healthcare systems, where doctors are often self-employed and there is 
evidence of a substantial and persistent GPG. In this respect our findings reinforce and extend 
the suggestion by Theurl and Winner (2010) that the pronounced GPG among physicians is 
not a feature of the country specific healthcare system and, in doing so, raise further 
questions about the role of gender differences in preferences relating to income and work-life 
balance as possible drivers (see Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2007), albeit these preferences may be 
determined by discrimination and social norms. In contrast, however, the comparison with 
other occupations within Britain reinforces the distinct nature of the GPG among public 
sector doctors and questions the above interpretation, with the GPG nearly three times as 
large than among private sector doctors (6 log per cent) or public sector health professionals 
(7 log per cent). The larger GPG relative to private sector doctors is particularly surprising in 
the context of a narrower GPG in the public relative to the private sector in Britain (Jones et 
al., 2018) and among public relative to private sector doctors in Italy (Gaiaschi, 2019). Given 
the potential differences in the nature of public and private sector healthcare in Britain, these 
findings highlight the need for further investigation, which is able to control for selection 
into, and heterogeneity in the composition of doctors within, each sector. 
We investigate the drivers of the substantial mean GPG among public sector doctors 
and find that it is predominately unexplained by personal and work-related characteristics 
typically used to explore the GPG. As a result, and albeit an upper bound measure, the 
evidence suggests a potentially large role for wage inequality (18 log per cent) among doctors 
in the public sector in Britain, despite the existence of transparent salary scales and 
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requirements of the PSED. Moreover, this finding is robust to a range of sensitivity analysis, 
including to the sample, model specification, year of data and measure of pay. In relation to 
the latter, our findings are not driven by the focus on hourly as opposed to annual pay, or the 
precise measure of pay adopted, suggesting the GPG is not predominately a function of 
additional payments, overtime or PRP.  
In addition to providing an important contribution to the international literature on 
physicians from the predominately public UK healthcare system, the evidence is clearly 
important to the government ambition to eliminate the GPG among doctors in the UK NHS. 
While our evidence supports the role of age, as a proxy for experience, in explaining the 
GPG, consistent with the existence of long salary scales that reward time served (see 
Department of Health and Social Care, 2020) and advantage the historical representation of 
men in the profession, the relatively minor role of gender differences in observable personal 
and work-related characteristics should be of particular concern. Indeed, this points to the 
need for more explicit consideration of the GPG within the profession, including by the 
DDRB as it makes annual pay recommendations in an era of growing GPG transparency.  
Unlike the majority of the literature on physicians, we extend our analysis of the mean 
GPG and find evidence of gender pay inequality among public sector doctors across the 
earnings distribution. Moreover, we find that wage inequality is exacerbated among high 
earners consistent with a ‘glass ceiling’ effect, suggesting particular scrutiny at the top end of 
the wage distribution is required. Indeed, despite being based on different data and a different 
sample, a likely explanation for the contrast between our findings and the predominately 
explained nature of the mean GPG among hospital doctors in England (Department of Health 
and Social Care, 2020) is the exclusion of controls for vertical segregation in our analysis. 
The extent to which such direct controls for seniority should be included in the analysis of the 
GPG can be debated and we are unable to explore this further in the absence of occupation 
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specific measures in the ASHE. However, the implications for future policy and practice 
appear profound and point to the urgent need for analysis of gender differences in earnings 
growth (see Esteves-Sorenson and Sydner, 2012), promotion and progression among public 
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% female  44.30 54.03 70.13 68.61 49.54 
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GPG (log points) 0.199 0.060 0.072 0.172 0.171 




Table 3. Decomposition of the mean hourly GPG across occupations 
 


























































































































Population size 205,838 45,359 107,218 5,520,053 
N 1,099 243 604 35,560 
Notes: (i) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is performed using a model which includes personal and work-related 
characteristics. Rest of the public sector also includes SOC 2010 major groups (nine categories) and SIC 
sections (four categories). Rest of public sector health professionals also include occupation dummies for 
detailed SOC 2010, where 2219 Health Professionals n.e.c are grouped with 2214 Ophthalmic opticians and 
2216 Veterinarians due to small sample size in these categories. (ii) Decompositions are calculated using the 
relevant male coefficients as the baseline. (iii) Figures in [ ] are proportions of observed GPG. (iv) * p < 0.05, 




Table 4. Decomposition of the mean annual GPG across occupations 
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Population size 205,838 45,359 107,218 5,520,053 
N 1,099 243 604 35,560 






































Population size 205,838 45,359 107,218 5,520,053 
N  1,099 243 604 35,560 
Notes: (i) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is performed using a model which includes personal and work-related 
characteristics plus controls for log hours per week and log total annual weeks worked. Rest of the public sector 
also includes SOC 2010 major groups (nine categories) and SIC sections (four categories). Rest of public sector 
health professionals also include occupation dummies for detailed SOC 2010, where 2219 Health Professionals 
n.e.c are grouped with 2214 Ophthalmic opticians and 2216 Veterinarians due to small sample size in these 
categories. (ii) Decompositions are calculated using the relevant male coefficients as the baseline. (iii) Figures in 








Figure 1. Decomposition of the hourly GPG across the distribution, across occupations 
Notes: (i) Machado-Mata decomposition is performed using a model which includes personal and work-related 
characteristics. Rest of public sector employees include SOC 2010 major groups (nine categories) and SIC 
sections (four categories). Rest of public sector health professionals also include occupation dummies for 
detailed SOC 2010, where 2219 Health Professionals n.e.c are grouped with 2214 Ophthalmic opticians and 
2216 Veterinarians due to small sample size in these categories. Observed GPG is estimated using the 





Table A1. Sample means for explanatory variables by gender and occupation 
 
 Public sector doctors Private sector doctors Rest of the public sector 
health professionals 
Rest of the public sector  
 All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female 
Age  39.83 41.17 38.15 40.75 41.58 40.05 40.64 42.67 39.77 43.12 42.68 43.33 
Work region
a
 (%)            
North 
England 
27.16 28.85 25.03 20.32 16.91 23.23 27.72 31.18 26.25 25.45 24.10 26.06 
East England 22.08 20.94 23.51 29.56 26.82 31.89 24.10 26.11 23.25 25.78 23.61 26.78 
West England 
and Wales 
19.15 19.13 19.19 12.02 12.23 11.85 20.05 17.14 21.29 21.29 20.55 21.63 
London 16.09 16.58 15.48 26.58 34.59 19.76 15.36 12.19 16.71 14.50 18.46 12.69 
Scotland 15.52 14.50 16.80 11.52 9.45 13.27 12.77 13.38 12.50 12.98 13.29 12.83 
Tenure (years) 5.49 5.73 5.18 4.84 5.32 4.44 8.87 9.89 8.43 9.76 10.58 9.39 
Contract type (%)            
Permanent 
employment 
60.26 62.42 57.55 80.10 80.48 79.77 93.14 92.04 93.60 92.15 93.83 91.38 
Full-time 84.98 88.06 81.10 60.56 70.83 51.82 70.22 84.11 64.30 69.38 88.56 60.60 
Firm-size 
(employees) 
11,249 11,267 11,226 2,828 3,625 2,149 10,807 10,803 10,808 11,676 13,052 11,048 
Collective 
agreement (%) 
88.03 88.07 87.98 35.24 34.13 36.18 85.67 86.37 85.38 89.14 89.72 88.87 
Detailed occupation (%)            
Psychologists - - - - - - 20.95 19.87 21.41 - - - 
Pharmacists - - - - - - 14.47 12.53 15.29 - - - 
Dental 
practitioners 
- - - - - - 5.11 8.36 3.73 - - - 
Medical 
radiographers 
- - - - - - 28.60 27.53 29.06 - - - 
Podiatrists - -  - - - 5.57 7.61 4.70 - - - 
Health 
professionals 


































Due to small sample sizes in region in some specifications, we group NUTS administrative regions in the UK as follows: 1. North England: North West, North East, 
Yorkshire and The Humber; 2. East England: East Midlands, East, South East, 3. West England and Wales: West Midlands, South West, Wales, 4. London, 5. Scotland. 
b
We 
group SOC 2010 code 2219 Health Professionals n.e.c with 2214 Ophthalmic opticians and 2216 Veterinarians due to small sample size in these categories. Broad occupation 
and industry are also included in specification for the rest of the public sector. Summary statistics for these are not reported here but are available upon request. 
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Table A2. Decomposition of the mean hourly GPG across occupations, sensitivity analysis 
 





Rest of public 
sector health 
professionals 
Rest of public 
sector 
employees 
Panel A. Using female coefficients as the baseline   
GPG 0.199*** 0.060 0.072* 0.172*** 
















Population size 205,838 45,359 107,218 5,520,053 
N 1,099 243 604 35,560 
Panel B. Using pooled coefficients as the baseline  
Observed GPG 0.199*** 0.060 0.072* 0.172*** 
















Population size 205,838 45,359 107,218 5,520,053 
N 1,099 243 604 35,560 
Panel C. Dependent variable log hourly pay including overtime  
Observed GPG 0.210*** 0.064 0.079* 0.175*** 
















Population size 205,838 45,359 107,218 5,520,053 
N 1,099 243 604 35,560 
Panel D. Dependent variable log hourly pay excluding additional premium payments 
Observed GPG 0.210*** 0.061 0.065 0.180*** 
















Population size 205,838 45,359 107,218 5,520,053 
N 1,099 243 604 35,560 
Panel E. Only full-time employees    
Observed GPG 0.196*** 0.177 0.101** 0.107*** 
















Population size 174,923 27,470 75,286 3,829,814 
N 930 144 417 23,816 
Panel F. Only full-time and full-year employees (employed 40 or more weeks per year)  
Observed GPG 0.255*** 0.073 0.091** 0.109*** 


















Population size 116,838 21,807 64,615 3,296,256 
N 622 115 359 20,534 
Panel G. Unweighted      
Observed GPG 0.196*** 0.048 0.076* 0.160*** 
















Population size - - - - 
N 1,099 243 604 35,560 
Panel H. Controlling for holding more than one job   
Observed GPG 0.199*** 0.060 0.072* 0.172*** 
















Population size 205,838 45,359 107,218 5,520,053 
N 1,099 243 604 35,560 
Panel I. Excluding employees who hold more than one job   
Observed GPG 0.204*** 0.073 0.069 0.165*** 
















Population size 194,275 41,794 100,684 5,124,973 
N 1,038 224 568 32,877 
Panel J. ASHE 2017     
Observed GPG 0.204*** 0.028 0.033 0.176*** 
















Population size 194,927 45,733 107,128 5,590,044 
N 1,072 243 616 37,232 
Panel K. ASHE 2019 provisional    
Observed GPG 0.202*** 0.009 0.054 0.151*** 
















Population size 195,045 44,578 110,314 5,306,098 
N 1,054 229 627 34,314 
Notes: (i) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is performed using a model which includes personal and work-related 
characteristics. Specification in Panel B includes a gender dummy variable following Fortin (2008). The full-
time indicator is excluded in Panels E and F. Rest of the public sector also includes SOC 2010 major groups 
(nine categories) and SIC sections (four categories). Rest of public sector health professionals also include 
occupation dummies for detailed SOC 2010, where 2219 Health Professionals n.e.c are grouped together with 
2214 Ophthalmic opticians and 2216 Veterinarians due to small sample size in these categories. (ii) 
Decompositions are calculated using the relevant male coefficients as the baseline unless stated otherwise. (iii) 






Table A3. Decomposition of the hourly GPG at selected percentiles, across occupations 



















































































Private sector doctors        
Observed GPG 0.192 0.144 0.066 -0.005 0.037 0.134
*
 0.209 

































































































































































 Notes: (i) Machado-Mata decomposition is performed using a model which includes personal characteristics 
and work-related characteristics. Rest of public sector employees include SOC 2010 major groups (nine 
categories) and SIC sections (four categories). Rest of public sector health professionals also include occupation 
dummies for detailed SOC 2010, where 2219 Health Professionals n.e.c are grouped with 2214 Ophthalmic 
opticians and 2216 Veterinarians due to small sample size in these categories. Observed GPG is estimated using 
the conditional quantile model. (ii) Decompositions are calculated using the relevant male coefficients as the 
baseline. (iii) Figures in [ ] are proportions of observed GPG. (iv) Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 
replications.* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
